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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Adoption-Wills-Inheritance Rights of an After-Adopted Child
The testatrix executed her will in 1938 with no reference to or mention of a child and in 1949 she and her husband legally adopted a minor
child. The testatrix tied in 1950 and the 1938 will was offered for
probate in solemn form. A caveat to the probate was filed on behalf of
the adopted child, alleging that the will had been revoked, as a matter
of law, by the adoption. The trial court sustained a motion to strike the
caveat, and upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia, with one justice
dissenting, reversed.' Held, the adoption of the child revoked the will
which was executed prior to the adoption.1
In this case the Georgia court construed an adoption statute 2 in
conjunction with an after-born statute, 3 and concluded that the adopted
child stood in the same position as a natural born chlid. Georgia thus
joined the majority group of those jurisdictions which have construed
similar statutes. 4 The express language of the statute provided that,
Thornton et al. v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 64 S. E. 2d 186 (1951).
§74-414 (1949): ".. . Said adopted child shall be considered
in all respects as if it were a child of natural bodily issue of petitioner or petitioners, and shall enjoy every right and privilege of a natural child of petitioner
or petitioners; and shall be deemed a natural child of petitioner or petitioners to
inherit under the laws of descent and distribution in the absence of a will and to
take under the provisions of any instrument of testamentary gift, bequest, devise
or legacy unless expressly excluded therefrom."
'GA. CODE ANN. §113-408 (1933) : "In all cases, the marriage of the testator
or the birth of a child to him, subsequently to the making of a will in which no
provision is made in contemplation of such an event, shall be a revocation of the
will."
'Grimes v. Jones, 193 Ark. 858, 103 S. W. 2d 359 (1937) ; Flannigan v. Howard,
200 Ill. 396, 65 N. E. 782 (1902); Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 Ill. 363, 141 N. E. 178
(1923) ; Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Iowa 159, 80 N. W. 332 (1899) ; Dreyer v. Schrick,
105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30 (1919); White v. White, 322 Mass. 30, 76 N. E. 2d 15
(1947) ; In re Rendell's Estate, 224 Mich. 197, 221 N. W. 116 (1928) ; In re Alter's
Will, 92 N. J. Eq. 415, 112 Atl. 483 (1921) ; Hahn v. Sorgen, 50 N. M. 83, 171 P.
2d 308 (1946); Bourne v. Dorney, 184 App. Div. 476, 171 N. Y. Supp. 264 (2d
Dep't 1918), affd without ophion, 227 N. Y. 641, 126 N. E. 901 (1919) ; accord,
In re Guilmartin's Estate, 156 Misc. 699, 282 N. Y. Supp. 525 (Surr. Ct. 1935),
aff'd, 250 App. Div. 762, 293 N. Y. Supp. 665 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd without opinion,
277 N. Y. 689, 14 N. E. 2d 627 (1938) ; In re Kelly's Estate, 182 Misc. 481, 44
N. Y. S. 2d 438 (Surr. Ct. 1943) ; Alexander v. Samuels, 177 Okl. 323, 58 P. 2d
878 (1936) ; Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S. C. 408, 172 S. E. 426 (1934) ; Marshall
v. Marshall, 25 Tenn. App. 309, 156 S. W. 2d 449 (1941); Bell v. Bell, 180 S. W.
2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605, 87 N. W. 853
(1901) ; Sandon v. Sandon, 123 Wis. 603, 101 N. W. 1089 (1905) ; In re McLean's
Estate, 219 Wis. 222, 262 N. W. 707 (1935).
Contra: Russell v. Russell, 84
Ala. 48, 3 So. 900 (1888) ; In re Comassi's Estate, 107 Cal. 1, 40 Pac. 15 (1895) ;
Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 860 (1890) ; Succession of McRacken, 162
.La. 443, 110 So. 645 (1926) ; Sorrell v. Sorrell, 193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 306 (1927).
Some jurisdictions have provided by statute that adoption of a child will revoke
or set aside prior will. ARiz CODE ANN. §41-107 (1939); CONN. GEN. STAT. §6956
1

' GA. CODE ANN.
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"said adopted child shall be considered in all respects as if it were a child
of natural bodily issue... and shall enjoy every right and privilege of a
natural child. . . ." This seems to express clearly a legislative intention
that an adopted child is to have a standing, in law, equivalent to that of
a natural child in all respects, and that birth by law and birth by nature
are to be considered the same.
The opinion of the dissenting judge is based primarily upon a strict
literal interpretation of the after-born statute and the statute empowering
a person to dispose of his property by will. 5 His argument that these
statutes are confined solely to the question of a person's right to make a
will and neither deal with nor have any relation to the law of inheritance
as provided by the statute of distribution and the law of adoption is
hardly persuasive. If the will is revoked by the subsequent marriage of
the testator or the birth of a child to him, then it is necessary to go to
the law of descent and distribution to determine what disposition will be
made of his property. The argument of the dissent also runs contrary
to the majority view which holds that the statute of adoption and all
statutes in pari nmteri therewith must be read and construed together. 6
The point at issue has arisen in North Carolina on two prior occasions, 7 but under an adoption statute8 which has since been completely
(1949) (see Fulton Trust Co. v. Trowbridge, 126 Conn. 369, 11 A. 2d 393 (1940)) ;
OHIo GEN. CoDE ANN. §10504-49 (1937) (Ohio formerly with majority, see Surman v. Surman, 114 Ohio St. 579, 153 N. E. 873 (1925)); PA. STAT. ANN. title 20,
§273 (1950) (Pennsylvania formerly contra, see Goldstein v. Hammell, 236 Pa.
305, 84 Atl. 772 (1912) ; In re Boyd's Estate, 270 Pa. 504, 113 Atl. 691 (1921).

Adopted child as within contemplation of statutory provision relating to pretermitted children. James v. Helmich, 186 Ark. 1053, 57 S. W. 2d 829 (1933) ; It

re Smith's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 456, 195 P. 2d 842 (1948) ; Bakke v. Bakke,
175 Minn. 193, 220 N. W. 601 (1928) ; Thomas v. Malone, 142 Mo. App. 193, 126
S. W. 522 (1910); Remmers v. Remmers, 239 S. W. 509 (Mo. 1922); Robertson
v. Cornett, 359 Mo. 1156, 225 S. W. 2d 780 (1949) ; Mares v. Martinez, 54 N. M.
1, 212 P. 2d 772 (1949); Van Brocklyn v. Wood, 38 Wash. 384, 80 Pac. 530
(1905) ; In re Hebb's Estate, 134 Wash. 424, 235 Pac. 974 (1925).
'GA. CODE ANN. §113-106 (1933).
'Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 303 Ky. 604, 198 S. W. 2d 326 (1946); Wilson v.

Anderson, 232 N. C. 212, 59 S. E. 2d 836 (1950); Hahn v. Sorgen, 50 N. M. 83,
171 P. 2d 308 (1946) ; In re Heye's Estate, 149 Misc. 890, 269 N. Y. Supp. 530
(Surr. Ct. 1933), aff'd, It re Heye's Will, 241 App. Div. 907, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1042
(4th Dep't 1934); Nat. Bk. of Lima v. Hancock, 85 .Ohio App. 1, 88 N. E. 2d 67
(1948); Marshall v. Marshall, 25 Tenn. App. 309, 156 S. W. 2d 449 (1941);
Batchelder v. Walworth, 85 Vt. 322, 82 Atl. 7 (1912).
1Sorrell v. Sorrell, 193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 306 (1927). T executed will at
time when he had no children, leaving all his property to wife. Later a child was
adopted for life and another was born to T and his wife. T died without changing
his will. Held, natural child allowed to upset the will and share in his father's
estate as if father had died intestate; but adopted child not entitled to inherit. Basis
of decision was that adoption statute expressly provided that adopted child should
inherit as if natural child only if adopting parent died intestate. See Note, 29 N. C.
L. REv. 218 (1951).
King v. Davis, 91 N. C. 142 (1884). T died leaving will in which he left certain property to D, an infant and illegitimate child. Between date of making will
and his death, T adopted D for life. D rejected gifts in will as being bestowed on
a "stranger" and sought to take by virtue of the after-born statute as if T had died
intestate. Held, the capacity of an adopted child to inherit is established by statute
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revised. In each of these early decisions it was held that the adopted
child could not inherit. The court was compelled to reach such a result, however, because of the express wording of the then adoption
statute which very definitely provided that the adopted child could inherit only if the adoptive parent died intestate.
The North Carolina adoption statute was rewritten in 1941, 9 and
this revised statute 10 did not contain the provision of the prior acts
that the adoptee would inherit only if the adoptive parent died intestate.
The General Assembly in 1947 added new provisions to the laws of
descent 1 and distribution 12 which were to have taken effect with the
new adoption act of that year.' 3 These provisions were designed to
spell out specifically the details of the adopted child's inheritance rights. 14
Under present North Carolina statutes our court, if confronted with
such a case, should reach a result similar to that reached by the Georgia
court. The will would not be revoked, however, but only set aside to
allow the child to receive his intestate share of the estate. 15 This fact
which obviously looks to an intestacy and has no reference to cases in which

property
is disposed of by will.
8
N . C. PuB. LAWS c. 155, §3 (1872-73) : "Such order [order of court granting
letters of adoption], when made, shall have the effect forthwith to establish the relations of parent and child between the petitioner and the child or children during the
minority or for the life of such child, according to the prayer of the petition, with
all the duties, powers and rights belonging to the actual relationship of parent and
child, and in case the adoption be for the life of the child, and the petitioner die
intestate, such order shall have the further effect to enable such child to inherit the
real estate and entitle it to the personal estate of the petitioner in the same manner
and to the same extent such child would have been entitled to do, if such child had
been the actual child of the person adopting it: Provided, such child shall not so
inherit, and be so entitled to personal estate if the petitioner specially set forth in
his petition such to be his desire and intentions." This statute with but few slight
changes remained in force until 1941.
' See Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N. C. 212, 59 S. E. 2d 836 (1950) and Fairley,
Inheritance Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N. C. L. REv. 227 (1951) for excellent discussion of the history of the North Carolina adoption statute and its
interpretation by the court.
10 N. C. PuB. LAws c. 281, §4 (1941).
l'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §29-1(14) (1950): "An adopted child shall be entitled by
succession or inheritance to any real property by, through, and from its adoptive
parents
the same as if it were the natural, legitimate child of the adoptive parents."
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-149(10) (1950) : "An adopted child shall be entitled by
succession, inheritance, or distribution of personal property, including, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, any recovery of damages for the wrongful
death of such adopted parent by, through, and from its adoptive parents the same
as if it were the natural, legitimate child of the adoptive parents."
" The adoption statute was revised completely in the same session of the Legislature, but because of the failure to provide an enacting clause, the adoption act of
1947 was held void and the act of 1941 continued in effect. See It re Advisory
Opinion, 227 N. C. 708, 43 S. E. 2d 73 (1947), and N. C. PuB. LAWs c. 300 (1947).
1' N. C. GEN. STAT. §48-23 (1950) : "The final order forthwith shall establish
the relationship of parent and child between the petitioners and the child, and, from
the date of the signing of the final order of adoption, the child shall be entitled to
inherit real and personal property from the adoptive parents in accordance with the
statutes of descent and distribution." This statute is largely a reenactment of the
void5 act of 1947. See note 13 supra.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-8 (1950) : "No will shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances." The subse-
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should make the reaching of such a result easier for our court than it
was for the Georgia court. There also seems to be a better case for
such a result under present North Carolina statutes than there is under
the Georgia statutes. Our G. S. 31-4516 specifically gives the after-born
child what may be described as "intestacy rights" in that it is provided
that such child shall inherit as if the parent had died intestate. Then
under G. S. 28-149(10) and G. S. 29-1(14), "intestacy rights" are given
to the adopted child, in that such child is entitled by succession or inheritance to any real or personal property by, through and from its
adoptive parents as if it were the natural, legitimate child of the adoptive
parents. There are no "intestacy rights" expressly given to after-born
children under the Georgia after-born statute.1 7 However, such rights
seem unquestionably to be impliedly granted by the provision that the
"will shall be revoked." And while the Georgia adoption statute18 gives
"intestacy rights" to the adopted child in that he is to inherit as a natural
child under the laws of descent and distribution in the absence of a will,
this leaves it rather indefinite as to what he is to take in case there is a
will.
The North Carolina adoption acts since 1941 show clearly a legislative purpose to place the adopted child in the same position as the
natural born child. 19 The omission of the provision found in former
adoption statutes that adopted children shall inherit only if the adoptive
parent dies intestate is a strong indication that the Legislature intended
that the adopted child should be considered in all respects as a natural
born child.2 0 This design is further evidenced by the express legislative
declaration that the adoption act should be liberally construed in favor
of the child. 21
quent birth of issue or adoption of a child does not revoke a will as does a subsequent marriage under G. S. 31-6. Sorrell v. Sorrell, 193 N. C. 439, 137 S.E. 306

(1927). While after-born children not provided for in their deceased parent's will
may claim by inheritance their part of the estate under G. S. 31-45, it does not
amount to revocation of the entire will. Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N. C. 679, 132

S. E. 796 (1926).

1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-45 (1950): "Children born after the making of the
parent's will, and whose parent shall die without making any provision for them,

shall be entitled to such share and proportion of the parent's estate as if he or she
had died intestate, and the rights of any such after-born child shall be a lien on
every part of the parent's estate, until his several share thereof is set apart in the
manner prescribed in G. S. 28-153 to 28-158."
11 GA. CoDE ANN. §113-408 (1933).
See note 3 sutpra.
18 GA. CoDE ANN. §74-414 (1949).
See note 2 supra.
See notes 10-14 supra.
.'Eliminating the provision that an adopted child can inherit only if the adoptive parent dies intestate removes the basis upon which the court in the past has
10

maintained its holding that an adopted child cannot upset a will. Sorrell v. Sorrell
and King v. Davis, note 7 supra,are thus not now controlling precedents, for their

results were founded directly on the express provision of an adoption statute which

is no longer in effect.
2"N. C. GEN. STAT. §48-1(3) (1950) : "When the interests of a child and those
of an adult are in conflict, such conflict should be resolved in favor of the child;
and to that end this chapter should be liberally construed."
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It is by no means certain, however, that the North Carolina court
would reach the result advocated.. As the right of inheritance from adoption is in derogation of the common law, the court has held that adoption
statutes are to be strictly construed so as not to enlarge or confer any
rights not clearly given. 22 It cannot be 'denied that a strict and literal
reading of G. S. 31-45 does not make an after-adopted child an afterborn child. But it must be remembered that a strict and literal reading'
of our adoption act is expressly condemned by that act itself.23
A question pertinent to the matter under consideration, and not
raised in the Georgia case, is: what adoption law shall be controlling,
that in effect on the 'date of adoption or that in effect at the date of the
death of the adoptive parent? In the recent case of Wilson v. Anderson,2 4 the court stated that decisions of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina are to the effect that the law in force at the time of adoption
governs the right of the child to inherit. The decisions cited by the
court to uphold this statement are Grimes v. Grimes,25 and Phillips v.
Phillips,26 and neither is authority for such a holding. 27 The statement
of the court that an inspection of the various adoption acts reveals
plainly a legislative intent that each should be prospective in effect is
2 In re Holder, 218 N. C. 136, 10 S. E. 2d 620 (1940); Ward v. Howard, 217
N. C. 201, 7 S. E. 2d 625 (1940) ; Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E. 573
(1935); Edwards v. Yearby, 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19 (1915).
2' See note 21 supra. It is obvious that the after-born statute as now written is
leading toward a lawsuit. It is proposed, therefore, that the Legislature amend
G. S. 31-45 to expressly include adopted children within its provisions. See SECOND
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REvIsION OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA

RELATING TO ESTATES 87 (1939).

"' 232 N. C. 212, 59 S. E. 2d 836 (1950). P, adopted child of deceased brother
of intestate, seeks to inherit through her deceased adoptive father. P was adopted
in 1919; intestate died in 1949. Held, P is not entitled to inherit even though the
brother of her deceased adoptive father died after the effective date of G. S. 28149(10) and G. S. 29-1(14), the amendments to the statutes of descent and distribution.
- 207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E. 573 (1935).
28227 N. C. 438, 42 S. E. 2d 604 (1947).
2? The question of what law governed was not even at issue in the Grimes case.
The issue there was whether a child could inherit through its adoptive parent under
the statute which was in force from 1873 until 1941. The case is in reality authority
for a holding contra to the statement made by the court in Wilsont v. Andcrson.
The child was adopted in 1924 when the adoption act of 1919 was in effect; and in
determining the rights of the child, the court based its decision upon the act of
1933, the act in force at the time of the death of the intestate from whom the child
claimed. The act of 1919 had been repealed and rewritten in 1933. It must be
admitted that each law was virtually the same; but, be that as it may, the child
was adopted under the provisions of the act of 1919 and his rights were determined
under the act of 1933.
The decision in the Phillips case was based upon the express provision of the
1941 adoption act. The child had been adopted in 1924, and in this action sought
to take through her deceased adoptive father. The court did not state that the
controlling law was that in effect at the date of adoption (although the decision did
have that result) but simply held that the adopted child could not take advantage
of the 1941 act because of its express provision that it applied only to adoptions
made after March 15, 1941. The present adoption act does not have such a prospective provision.
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certainly open to argument. The court apparently arrives at such a
conclusion from the provision of G. S. 48-34.28 Only in the adoption
act of 194129 is there any express legislative intention, and it is to be
noted that this act was made largely retroactive. 30 Certainly, allowing
the adopted child to take the benefits of a later act would not interfere
with vested rights or judgments already entered. 31
It is to be particularly noted that the adopted child in the original
hearing of Wilson v. Anderson was not seeking to take as of the date of
the death of her adoptive father but as of the date of the death of the intestate brother of her adoptive father.32 The contention that the controlling law should be that in effect at the date of death of the adoptive parent
was first brought up in a petition to rehear Wilson v. Anderson, and in
a short opinion denying a rehearing, the court made statements which
are susceptible of the interpretation that the applicable law is that in
33
effect at the date of the adoptive parent's death.
Ordinarily the disposition of an intestate's property is governed by
the statutes in force at the time of his death. 34 The majority view is
.8N. C. GEN.

STAT.

§48-34 (1950) : "All proceedings for the adoption of minors

in courts of this State are hereby validated and confirmed and the orders and judg-

ments heretofore entered therein are declared to be binding upon all parties to said
proceedings and their privies and all other persons, until such orders or judgments
shall be vacated as provided by law. .. ." This provision ran through all the

adoption acts and is simply a statement of respect by the Legislature for all prior

adoption proceedings. There is no indication from this that it was intended that
benefits granted in later acts should not apply to all adoptions. The only intent
evident seems to be that no provision of the new act is to be construed so as to
invalidate existing adoptions. It is rather difficult to imagine how allowing all
adopted children to take advantage of the new provisions of inheritance could in
any way affect the validity of a previous adoption. It seems that this is a rather
weak foundation for the statement by the court that an inspection of the adoption
statutes, "reveals plainly a legislative intent that each shall have prospective effect."
" N. C. PuR. LAws c. 281, §8 (1941).
"0See note 10 supra.
"1As a general rule, rights of inheritance are determined by those laws in effect
upon the date of death of the owner intestate. Before his death, no one can have
any claim as an heir to his property. See Sorenson v. Rasmussen, 114 Minn. 324,
328, 131 N. W. 325 (1911), where a statute which gave increased rights of inheritance to adopted children was held to apply to all adopted children, whether
adopted before or after the passage of such statute. It was held that this would
not make the act retrospective. The court stated at page 328 of the opinion: "This
statute does not give to past acts a new effect upon mutual rights or liabilities.
Nor does it change or affect existing rights. Rights by inheritance in an estate do
not accrue until the death of the owner intestate."
2" See note 24 supra. According to the great weight of authority, the right of
an adopted child to inherit through an adoptive parent from relatives of such parent
is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the death of the person from
whom inheritance is claimed. Brooks Bank & Trust Co. v. Rorabacher, 118 Conn.
202, 171 Atl. 655 (1934) ; In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d 904 (1943) ;
Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 303 Ky. 604, 198 S. W. 2d 326 (1946) ; Appeal of Latham,
124 Me. 120, 126 At. 626 (1924); Sorenson v. Rasmussen, 114 Minn. 324, 131
N. W. 325 (1911) ; Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697
(1906) ; Eck v. Eck, 145 S. W. 2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
"2Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N. C. 521, 61 S. E. 2d 447 (1950) (Child adopted in
1919. Adoptive parent died in 1943. Held, whatever rights of inheritance child
acquired by adoption became vested upon the death of her adoptive parent, and the
law at that time applied only to adoptions made after March 15, 1941).
" Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N. C. 212, 220, 59 S. E. 2d 836, 843 (1950).
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that the law in force at the time of the adoptive parent's death 'determines
the right of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parent."a With
this generally accepted rule, together with the legislative intent which
may be inferred by the failure to include an express provision making the
act of 1949 prospective only,3 6 it is submitted that the court should consider the law in effect at the time of the death of the adoptive parent as
37
controlling.
HARRY E. FAGGART, JR.

Conflict of Laws-Custody Awards of Minor Children-urisdictional
and Full Faith and Credit Requirements
Where a decree awarding custody of a minor child is made in a state
court, and a subsequent modification of that decree is sought in the courts
of another state, two difficult questions are presented to the second court
before it may decide the case on its merits: Is there jurisdiction to make
the custody award, and if so, must full faith and credit be accorded the
decree made by the sister state?
These problems were raised by two recent cases decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. In Sadler v. Sadler,' husband and
wife, residents of North Carolina, agreed prior to an extra-legal separation that neither would take the two minor children out of the state
without notice to the other. The wife took the children to Georgia in
breach of this agreement, and resided there with them. The husband
sued out a writ of habeas corpus in a Georgia court, seeking custody of
the children. On return of the writ, custody was awarded to the wife.
Following this, the husband brought an action for divorce and for custody of the children2 in the North Carolina Superior Court. The wife
answered, requesting alimony and support for the children. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's award of custody to the husband,
holding that the North Carolina court did not have jurisdiction to render
the decree and that the Georgia decree was entitled to full faith and
credit.
Shortly after the decision in the Sadler case, another facet of this
" See Note, 18 A. L. R. 2d 960, 962. But see Blodgett v. Stowell, 189 Mass. 142,
75 N. E. 138 (1905), where it is held that the effect of the adoption is determined
by the law in force at the time of the adoption.
" The adoption act of 1949 did not contain a provision similar to that found in
the 1941 act that its provisions regarding inheritance applied only to subsequent
adoptions. See note 30 supra.
"See Fairley, Inheritance Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N. C. L. IRv.
227 (1951) who takes the contrary view in interpretation of the present North
Carolina statutes. Of course, if the adoptive parent died between 1941 and 1949
then the provisions of N. C. PuB. LAWS c. 281, §8 (1941), note 30 supra, would
be controlling. See notes 26 and 33 supra.
N. C. 49, 65 S. E. 2d 345 (1951).
-N. C. GEr. STAT. §50-7 (1950).
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